Probability, observers and the multiverse

Not sure if I'm putting this in the right place!

I have a question about probability and conscious observers. Aside from other arguments for and against a multiverse, does the idea that a multiverse could contain a vast number of consicous observes make it more likely, given that we find ourselves existing as conscious observers?

I feel like something is wrong with that argument but I can't say why. Supposing life only exists for a relatively brief time in this universe (again leaving aside arguments for how long life might actually continue) does the fact that we are conscious observers make it more likely that we find ourselves conscious and observing because there is a multiverse and there are many / limitless opportunities for conscious life to arise?

Another way of looking at this relates to the Boltzmann Brain problem. Again, I'm not looking at other arguments for and against Boltzman Brains (being a cognitively unstable idea, self-defeating argument etc), I just want to think about it as a thought experiment around probability. The central argument for us being boltzmann brains is that, supposing BBs can exist in an ongoing inflationary scenario, over vast amounts of time there would be vastly more Boltzmann brains than normal observers. However, I've never heard it put the other way round - that because was are conscious observers, this in itself mean we're more likely to be in a universe where BBs exist because then there would vastly more consicous observers?

Conscious observers have nothing to do with the multiverse theories. Why do you think they would/should and why would the universe care?

JuneSpring25 said:

TL;DR Summary: Are there probability arguments for a multiverse based on the existence of conscious observers?

Not sure if I'm putting this in the right place!

I have a question about probability and conscious observers. Aside from other arguments for and against a multiverse, does the idea that a multiverse could contain a vast number of consicous observes make it more likely, given that we find ourselves existing as conscious observers?

I feel like something is wrong with that argument but I can't say why.

I think these probabilistic arguments are deeply flawed. Consider this:

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 99.9% of chess games played every year are played between two computers - assume there are loads of projects round the world where computers play millions of games against each other every day. If you and I sit down to play a game of chess, does that mean there's a 99.9% chance that we are computers?

If the OP is referring to the 'measurement problem' inherent in theories of quantum interpretations such as Copenhagen that appear to require an observer, the multiverse and many worlds interpretations (MWI) of quantum foundation theories do not require an observer.